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NG9-1-1, CYBERSECURITY, AND
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MODEL
FRAMEWORK FOR A SECURE NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Andrew Jackson Coley

The critical communications infrastructure in the United States is now
outdated and inefficient, and therefore vulnerable to network crashes and cyberattacks. The failure to allocate resources efficiently arises from 9-1-1, the
public’s primary connection to emergency services in the United States.1 This
lapse in policy has recently garnered attention, bringing forth a new generation
of communications networks, which may be the saving grace of our emergency
communications infrastructure.2 This advancement is Next Generation 9-1-1
(NG9-1-1). NG9-1-1 is a substantial upgrade to today’s standard 9-1-1 system’s
“hardware, software, data and operational policies and procedures,” and will
improve data and call routing capabilities, integrate call data for use by
emergency responders, provide secure call networks, and deliver calls to the
appropriate Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), among other enhanced
capabilities.3
However, 9-1-1 networks across the United States will be advanced only
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1
9-1-1 Origin & History, NENA, https://www.nena.org/page/911overviewfacts (last
visited Nov. 1, 2018).
2
See Health of the US 9-1-1 System, 9-1-1 INDUSTRY ALLIANCE,
https://www.theindustrycouncil.org/9IA_Health_of_US_911%20_2_.pdf. (last visited Nov.
1, 2018).
3
What is NG9-1-1?, NENA, https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/
ng9-1-1_project/whatisng911.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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through policy and legislation that focuses on recognizing security as an integral
part of a network.4 If successfully implemented, NG9-1-1 may serve as a
template for implementing secure, reliable, and resilient communications
networks within both the public and private industry.5 As the next iteration of
advanced public safety communications networks, NG9-1-1 is an ideal
representation of advanced IP-enabled infrastructure with security measures
naturally integrated into the system.
In November 2017, Congress proposed legislation to advance the rollout of
NG9-1-1 systems.6 The proposed legislation is bringing much needed attention
to the underfunded emergency call network. It is also representative of a
significant issue facing 9-1-1 call networks throughout the country, which is the
inability to update Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP), the local location
where your 9-1-1 call is answered, without federal funding and resources.7
Across the United States, PSAPs are operating at regional and local levels,
and the results are significantly varied.8 Although there have been improvements
in PSAP’s throughout the country with many states and localities pushing hard
to update their systems to next generation technology, as former FCC Chairman
Wheeler stated in his testimony before Congress, “these islands of progress are
the exception, not the rule.”9 Many PSAPs face significant funding and
operational challenges, resulting in out-of-date capabilities equivalent to the
functionality of over thirty years ago.10 9-1-1 networks, by nature, are state run
or local programs.11 The NG9-1-1 proposed legislation presents an opportunity

4
Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of 2017, S. 2061, 115th Cong. (2017); Jane Edwards,
GAO: NHTSA Needs to Establish National 911 Program Performance Goals to Back
NG911 Implementation, EXEC. GOV. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.executivegov.com/2018/02/gao-nhtsa-needs-to-establish-national-911program-performance-goals-to-back-ng911-implementation/; Christine Kenneally, How to
Fix 911, TIME (Apr. 17, 2011),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2062452,00.html.
5
See Next Generation 9-1-1 Transition Policy Implementation Handbook, NENA (June
2011), https://www.911.gov/pdf/NENA_NG911_Transition_Policy_Handbook_2010.pdf.
6
Id.; Staff Discussion Draft- Next Generation 91-1- Act of 2017, NENA,
https://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/govaffairs/Overview_—
_Draft_Next_Gener.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
7
See David Raths, The NG911 Funding Gap, GOV’T TECH. (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen-911/The-NG911-Funding-Gap.html.
8
Health of the US 9-1-1 System, supra note 2.
9
Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Commc’n and Tech., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) (statement of Tom Wheeler,
Chairman, Fed. Commc’n Comm.) [hereinafter Hearings].
10 Raths, supra note 7.
11 Andrew Hartsig, Calling 911: Funding and Technological Challenges of County 911
Centers, NACO, https://www.naco.org/resources/calling-911-funding-and-technologicalchallenges-county-911-call-centers. (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
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for Congress to create legislation providing federal support to PSAPs while still
maintaining the localized nature of 9-1-1 operating systems.12 While the
operation of the current 9-1-1 model is effective at a local level, a lack of federal
support enables the continued use of outdated technology in many PSAPs across
the country.13 Further, without federal support, PSAPs will implement next
generation technology in vastly different proportions dependent upon locally
available funding.14 The scale of cyber vulnerabilities that IP-enabled call
networks present, and the discrepancies and disproportionate capabilities
between PSAPs create an imminent security threat to 9-1-1 call networks.15
Moreover, the NG9-1-1 initiative shows migration to more efficient and
sophisticated IP-enabled tech systems. As 9-1-1 networks transition to more
security-centric systems, it will be beneficial to enact legislation and create
policies that ensure nationwide infrastructure is duly updated and improved.
This Comment will evaluate prevalent security concerns that the transition
from current 9-1-1 network technologies to the next generation of IP enabled 91-1 call networks will highlight. This Comment will also analyze both local and
federal risk mitigation options, as well as applicability to the broader critical
infrastructure security within the United States. First, this Comment will look to
the history of 9-1-1 call networks, why they require an upgrade, and the
advantages of NG9-1-1 and advanced IP-based emergency call networks.
Second, while there are advantages to IP-based call networks, there are also risks
and vulnerabilities. This Comment will explore these risks by examining
commercial and private sector cyber breaches that exposed the vulnerabilities of
big data and IP-based networks, and the similar vulnerabilities present in NG91-1. Third, with an understanding of the risks and benefits of IP networks, we
apply those risks to 9-1-1 networks, and explore the advantages and mitigation
options brought by these networks. Due to the local nature of PSAPs and 9-1-1
call networks and the national scale of the problem, we look to other federal
programs operating on similar scales, as well as fundamental cybersecurity
hygiene practices that may aid in reducing risk to NG9-1-1 networks. Lastly,
this Comment will examine how increased federal involvement in 9-1-1, but not
necessarily a federalization of the system, can create a more secure emergency
call network. A look at proposed federal legislation and ongoing grant programs
12 Chris Nussman, NENA Applauds Introduction of NG9-1-1 Legislation, NENA (Nov. 3,
2017), https://www.nena.org/news/372953/NENA-Applauds-Introduction-of-NG9-1-1Legislation.htm.
13 See Raths, supra note 7; see also Collin Wood, Next-gen 911 Matching Grant Rules
Open for Comment, ST. SCOOP (Sept. 22, 2017), https://statescoop.com/rules-to-issue-nextgen-911-matching-grants-open-for-comment.
14 See 911.GOV, 911 Grant Program, NAT’L 911 PROGRAM ADMINISTERED GRANTS,
https://www.911.gov/project_911grantprogram.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
15 Raths, supra note 7.
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reveals an acknowledgement by legislators and the executive branch alike of the
need for increased support for NG9-1-1.
As society increasingly relies upon IP-based networks for incredible
advancements in technology, new threats and vulnerabilities emerge that must
be recognized and swiftly resolved.16 NG9-1-1 presents an opportunity to plan
for some of the greatest threats to society in the 21st century with a security first
perspective.17 Although experts within the public safety communications
industry have provided research and recommendations to increase the security
of PSAPs and NG9-1-1 networks, it is vital that enhanced cyber security of
PSAPs are implemented in a manner that is practicable.18 The nature of PSAPs,
and their varying capabilities and resources, makes the challenge of securing
seamlessly integrated PSAPs in the future all the more difficult. However, the
9-1-1 PSAP rollout reflects global advancements to IP-based systems with
seamless integration, and the best way to approach this migration of technology
is with a focus on security.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF 9-1-1
The one phone number that nearly every American can recognize is 9-1-1.19
According to the National Emergency Number Association, approximately
“96% of the U.S. is covered by some type of 9-1-1 service.”20 The number of 91-1 calls per year is approximately 240 million, and over 80 percent of those
calls are placed wirelessly.21 The advanced capabilities of “smartphones”
permits virtual interactions that are significantly more advanced than the basic
9-1-1 networks are capable of supporting.22 The Minnesota Department of
Public Safety states that: “a new generation of access devices presents a
technology challenge to systems originally designed to provide only fixed

16 Cyber Risks to Next Generation 9-1-1, NAT’L 911 PROGRAM ADMINISTERED GRANTS,
https://www.911.gov/pdf/OEC_NG911_Cybersecurity_Primer_May_2018.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2018).
17 See Future of 9-1-1 Issue Brief, CENTURYLINK, http://www.centurylink.com/asset/
business/enterprise/issue-brief/gbc-centurylink-n911-issue-brief-cm160716.pdf (last visited
Nov. 26, 2018).
18 Mike Beagles, BUILD A SMART PSAP CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: 8
CRITICAL “MUST-HAVES,” MISSIONCRITICALP ARTNERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 4:00 PM),
http://blog.mcp911.com/insights/psapcybersecuritymusthaves.
19 See 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1.
20 Id.
21 9-1-1 Statistics, NENA (Dec. 2017), https://www.nena.org/page/911Statistics.
22 See 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1; Next Generation 9-1-1 Transition Policy
Implementation Handbook, supra note 5.
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landline 911 calls.”23 Basic 9-1-1 systems experience difficulty in supporting
“text messages for emergencies, images and video (including support for
American Sign Language users), and easy access to additional data such as
telematics data, building plans and medical information over a common data
network.”24 The National Emergency Number Association (NENA), has pointed
out that increased “inter-communications across states, between states, and
across international boundaries requires that we create a more flexible 9-1-1
system design with much greater data handling capabilities.”25 As such, 9-1-1
systems throughout the country are due for an upgrade to prevailing technical
standards.26 Responders should reap the benefits of the litany of advancements
in wireless technology, such as the useful integration of data and standardized
interface surfaces for calls and messaging, because it will be standard in NG91-1 systems.27
II. WHAT IS NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1?
The transition from basic 9-1-1 networks to NG9-1-1 networks is, at its core,
a transition from analog to digital networks.28 The New and Emerging
Technologies 9-1-1 Act of 2008 summarized NG911 as “a national IP-enabled
emergency network capable of receiving and responding to all citizen-activated
emergency communications and improving information sharing among all
emergency response entities.”29 Accordingly, the Next Generation systems will
be able to receive all the data, text, and video capabilities that expand with
modern smartphone technology.30 These upgraded networks, called Emergency
Services Internet Protocol Networks (ESINets), provide PSAP’s the ability to
23 NEXTGEN 911, MINN. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
https://dps.mn.gov/divisions/ecn/programs/911/Pages/nextgen-911.aspx (last visited Nov. 1,
2018).
24 What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3.
25 Id.
26 Senators Nelson & Klobuchar, STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT—NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1
ACT OF 2017, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/govaffairs/
Overview_—_Draft_Next_Gener.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
27 9-1-1 Origin and History, supra note 1; NAT’L 9-1-1 PROGRAM 2017 NATIONAL 911
PROGRESS REPORT (Nov. 2017), https://www.911.gov/pdf/National-911-Program-ProfileDatabase-Progress-Report-2017.pdf; see also What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3.
28 Next Generation 911, supra note 5.
29 New and Emerging Technologies 911 Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110283, 122 Stat. 2620 (2008).
30 See Fed. Comm. Commc’n, 47 Fed. Reg. 78, 1799 (Jan. 9, 2013) (to be codified at
C.F.R. pt. 20) (discussing how Next Generation 9-1-1 technology will support text
messaging and other forms of data transmission); 1 NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1: THE ESSENTIAL
GUIDE TO GETTING STARTED, WEST CORP. (2013), http://www.intrado.com/sites/default/files/
documents/NextGen%209-11%20The%20Essential%20Guide%20to%20Getting%20
Started.pdf; Next Generation 9-1-1, supra note 5; What is NG9-1-1?, supra note 3.
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transmit larger and more significant amounts of information to police, EMS,
firefighters, and other emergency service personnel that PSAPs dispatch.31
ESINet’s are “designed with a high level of redundancy and resiliency to ensure
that the network can continue to operate and deliver 911 calls even if some of
the circuits or end points are no longer functioning.”32 Notoriously, natural
disasters disable the outdated PSAP’s basic 9-1-1 system, however, the 9-1-1
systems of the future will function during these dire times.33 In addition, the
consumers, people calling 9-1-1 in an emergency, will have the capability of
transmitting more useful information, such as real-time text messages, videos,
images, pertinent medical information and more to emergency responders.34 As
a result, data which was previously unusable by most 9-1-1 systems will provide
advanced capabilities to first responders in jurisdictions with NG9-1-1
systems.35 For example, NG9-1-1 networks allow for accurate location
information through data transmitted based on the location of the 9-1-1 caller.36
One of the significant aspects of NG9-1-1 will be the “seamless
interoperability” of the emergency network.37 “Seamless interoperability,” as
explained by the Association of Public Safety Communications (APCO), means
PSAPs are able to “dynamically share resources and reroute calls, which is
particularly valuable during high call volume periods and major disasters
affecting PSAP operations.” This ability to share resources and reroute calls
“should be possible regardless of what call handling equipment, computer aided
dispatch, or connecting networks . . . the PSAPs have deployed.”38 The president
of APCO states that “seamless interoperability will improve emergency
response operations and expand the market so that public safety benefits from
the competition and innovation enjoyed in the commercial sector.”39

31 Jeff Lupinacci, ESInets are a Game Changer for Public Safety and the First Step to
Next-Gen 911, GOV’T TECH. (May 6, 2015), http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen911/ESInets-Are-a-Game-Changer-for-Public-Safety.html; Next Generation 9-1-1, supra
note 5.
32 Lupinacci, supra note 31.
33 See Nussman, supra note 12 (discussing a legislative call for next generation 9-1-1
technology during a natural disaster).
34 DEP’T OF P UB. TRANSP., NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 (2018),
https://www.its.dot.gov/factsheets/pdf/JPO_NextGen911_v2.pdf.
35 NG9-1-1 Project, NENA, https://www.nena.org/page/NG911_Project (last visited
Sept. 21, 2018).
36 FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, INQUIRY CONCERNING 911 ACCESS, ROUTING, AND
LOCATION IN ENTERPRISE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, PS Docket No. 17-239 (Sept. 7,
2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-346580A1.pdf.
37 Martha Carter, Achieving Fully Interoperable NG9-1-1, ASS’N OF PUB. SAFETY
COMMC’N (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.apcointl.org/achieving-fully-interoperable-ng911/.
38 Id.
39 Achieving the True Promise of NG9-1-1, ASS’N OF PUB. SAFETY COMMC’N (June 12,
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Such interoperability will be particularly useful in a 9-1-1 outage, when the
public is unable to reach 9-1-1 call centers.40 In 2017, AT&T experienced a
nationwide 9-1-1 call failure, where 9-1-1 callers reported either a busy signal
or continuous ringing.41 This particular failure affected the United States on a
massive scale, affecting 18 states and the District of Columbia.42 The system
failure was a result of AT&T’s failure to follow “certain best practices outlined
by the FCC’s [(Federal Communications Commission)] Communications
Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council”.43 However, a fully integrated
NG9-1-1 network should be able to avoid an operational failure at such a large
scale due to the resiliency and interconnectedness of NG9-1-1 networks.44
Ideally, during a system failure, NG9-1-1 networks may transfer calls from one
PSAP to another without the technical difficulty of outdated 9-1-1 systems,
which relied upon specialized switches as opposed to IP-based networks.45 Basic
9-1-1 networks simply do not possess the dynamic technology required to ensure
that reliable public safety communications remain available to the public during
a third-party network outage.46 The systems of NG9-1-1, based on IP networks,
will possess the ability to transfer calls quickly and efficiently and have calls
redirected to operational PSAPs in the event other PSAPs experience failures
2017), https://www.apcointl.org/tabletopx/achieving-the-true-promise-of-next-generation-91-1.
40 Adrienne Lafrance, The 9-1-1 Paradox, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/03/the-9-1-1-paradox/519192/;
Amanda Jackson, FCC investigating AT&T 911 outage, CNN (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/08/us/att-911-outages-trnd/index.html; see also The Network,
FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/network (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (explaining that
FirstNet is a nationally designed network created to serve as a public safety communications
network with standards matching the commercial minimum standard, where seamless
interoperability refers to a PSAP’s ability to transfer calls and aid other PSAP’s exchange of
data between connecting networks (ESInets) across jurisdictions, and the seamless exchange
of data between ESInets and public information systems, as well as between NG9-1-1 and
FirstNet).
41 Lafrance, supra note 40; Jackson, supra note 40.
42 Id.
43 Colin Gibbs, AT&T’s 911 Outage ‘Result of Mistakes Made by AT&T,’ FCC’s Pai
says, FIERCE WIRELESS (May 18, 2017), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/at-t-s-911outage-result-mistakes-made-by-at-t-fcc-s-pai-says; FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau Reminds Communications Service Providers of Importance of
Implementing Network Reliability Best Practices, 17 FED. REG. 672 (Proposed July 12,
2017) (to be codified at 47 CFR §§ 0.191, 0.392),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-17-672A1.pdf.
44 Achieving the True Promise of Next Generation 9-1-1, supra note 39; White Paper:
NG9-1-1 Changes Everything: Will you Lead, Follow, or be Left Behind?, MOTOROLA
(2012),
https://www.motorolasolutions.com/content/dam/msi/docs/business/global_services_new/_d
ocuments/_staticfiles/ng9-1-1_white_paper.pdf.
45 White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44.
46 Id.
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within their systems. 47
NG9-1-1 will provide a significant number of benefits to public safety.48 With
advanced systems, emergency responders will be capable of responding to
emergencies with significantly more information than previously available.49
With assistance from the federal government in universal implementation of
NG9-1-1, the benefits of IP-based communications networks will be more far
reaching than any previously operated public safety system.50 NG9-1-1 will
provide vast improvements to the public safety arena, which is in vital need of
updates.51 However, the benefits of NG9-1-1 are dependent upon the successful
collection and processing of a significant amount of data.52 As such, NG9-1-1
will be subject to the same risks as other “big data” collectors, including major
data breaches affecting the public at large.53 Moreover, given the high stakes of
emergency preparedness and response, the consequences of a failure to
recognize the risks of an IP-based emergency network will likely have greater
consequences than the private sector.54 The first step in preparation is to review
the history of major data breaches with a security centric perspective in order to
avoid mistakes of the past.55
A. Big Data and Privacy Concerns
“Big data” refers to the collection and use of massive amounts of data sets to
form relationships.56 In the context of 9-1-1, collection of 9-1-1 caller data
produces a rich amount of information, providing first responders with critical
Id.
White Paper: A Next Generation 911 Cost Study A Basis for Public Funding
Essential to Bringing a Nationwide Next Generation 911 Network to America’s
Communication User and First Responders, FCC (Sept. 2011),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-309744A1.pdf.
49 White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44.
50 115th Cong., 1st Session (Nov. 2017); JILL C. GALLAGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R45253, NEXT GENERATION 911 TECHNOLOGIES: SELECT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2018).
51 Hearing on S. Hrg. 112-576 Before the Subcomm. on the Comm., Tech., and the
Internet of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 113th Cong., 32-33, (June 5,
2014).
52 Whitepaper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44.
53 F.C.C. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR STATEWIDE 9-1-1 SERVICE FOR FY 2015-2019 (July
2014), https://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/911/Net%20911/7th-Report/Texas_StrategicPlan_1519.pdf.
54 JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON COMM. CAPABILITIES OF EMERGENCY MED. AND PUB.
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES: REPORT TO CONG. 11-12 (Feb. 4, 2008),
https://www.ems.gov/pdf/FCC-JAC-Report.pdf.
55 See generally White Paper: NG9-1-1 Changes Everything, supra note 44.
56 Big Data and the Future of Privacy, EPIC, https://epic.org/privacy/big-data/ (last
visited Nov. 26, 2018).
47
48
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information in emergency responses.57 Big data has endless applications. For
example, big data collection methods form the basis for the most successful
companies of the 21st century.58 Google and Facebook collect massive quantities
of data about their users, and later sell that data for profit.59 Such uses of big data
are beneficial to society and largely contribute to economic growth.60 However,
there are significant privacy and security concerns related to the collection of
big data, in particular when network security flaws lead to the hacking and
stealing of inconceivable amounts of data.61
The most recent notable massive data breach and exposure of significant
quantities of data was the Equifax security breach of 2017.62 The private
information of 143 million Americans was accessed and exposed through this
credit reporting agency breach.63 The hackers were able to access credit card
numbers and documents containing personal information for over 200,000
people throughout the United States, UK, and Canada.64
Such a breach leaves anyone involved vulnerable, exposing the most private

57 See generally id.; Rebecca Jeschke, A Privacy Emergency: Consumer Rights at Risk
in Next Generation 911, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/03/privacy-emergency-consumer-rights-risk-next;
Notice of Request, 79 Fed. Reg 12251 (Mar. 4, 2014).
58 See, e.g., Avantika Monnappa, How Facebook is Using Big Data - The Good, the
Bad, and the Ugly, SIMPLILEARN (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.simplilearn.com/howfacebook-is-using-big-data-article.
59 Id.; Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-ishere/568198/.
60 FACT SHEET: PCAST Report on Big Data and Privacy: A Technological
Perspective, WHITE HOUSE (May 14, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/11/16/fact-sheet-pcast-report-big-data-and-privacy-technologicalperspective; Josh Green, Big Data: The Key to Economic Development?, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/big-data-the-key-to-economic-development/ (last
visited on Nov. 26, 2018).
61 Jason Parms, More Info, More Problems: Privacy and Security Issues in the Age of
Big Data, BUS. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.business.com/articles/privacy-and-securityissues-in-the-age-of-big-data/; see also Stacy Collett, Five New Threats to Your Mobile
Security, CSO (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2157785/dataprotection/five-new-threats-to-your-mobile-security.html (providing examples of network
security flaws that lead to stolen data).
62 See generally Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE
COMM. (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breachwhat-do.
63 Id.
64 Id. (explaining that the Equifax security breach allowed hackers to access information
including credit card numbers, and personal identifying information including names, Social
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver’s license numbers for thousands of card
holders); see generally OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., CYBER RISKS TO NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 2 (2016).
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and significant identifying information.65 Although Equifax’s awareness of a
bug in their system may be cited as irresponsible for careless cybersecurity
standards, data breaches of this scale are far from abnormal.66 For example, in
2013, Yahoo was hacked and an estimated 3 billion accounts were
compromised, reportedly most likely by a state sponsored actor.67 Other
significant data breaches include: eBay, JP Morgan Chase, the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, and Sony’s PlayStation Network, among many others.68
The significance of these breaches is in the characteristics that define them. Each
breach is the result of network vulnerabilities being exploited for one reason or
another.69 While the effects of a data breach on a commercial entity can
significantly damage an entity’s reputation, the effect of a large scale system
failure, or exploitation of the advanced systems of NG9-1-1 would place lives
directly in danger.70 An act of cyber breach on an NG9-1-1 system can critically
delay emergency services.71 With the imminent popularity of fully integrated
systems, next generation emergency services will become enhanced by the
massive quantities of data available through integration with elements of “smart
cities,” simultaneously creating a more effective emergency network, as well as
65 See Laurel K. Lackey, The Mother of All Breaches, How Equifax’s Data Hack May
Effect You Now…and in the Future, W. VA. LAW. REV. 1, 37 (2017) (describing how “more
personal information was released as a result of this breach than any other breach,” and the
“effects of the breach will not be known for years, even decades.”); McKay Smith & Garrett
Mulrain, Equi-Failure: The National Security Implications of the Equifax Hack and a
Critical Proposal for Reform, 9 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 549, 560 (2018).
66 Taylor Armerding, The 17 biggest data breaches of the 21st century, CSO (Jan. 26,
2018) https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breachesof-the-21st-century.html; Chris Arnold, After Equifax Hack, Calls For Big Changes In
Credit Reporting Industry, NPR (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/18/
558570686/after-equifax-hack-calls-for-big-changes-in-credit-reporting-industry.
67 Armerding, supra note 66.
68 Id.
69 Jessica Silver-Greenberg et al., JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million
Households, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/
jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/ (“hackers appeared to have obtained a list
of the applications and programs that run on JPMorgan’s computers . . . which they could
crosscheck with known vulnerabilities in each program and web application, in search of an
entry point back into the bank’s systems”); Mark Jewell, Encryption Faulted in TJX
Hacking, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/25/AR2007092500836.html?noredirect=on; Gordon Kelly,
eBay Suffers Massive Security Breach, All Users Change Their Passwords, FORBES (May
21, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonkelly/2014/05/21/ebay-suffers-massivesecurity-breach-all-users-must-their-change-passwords/#5b6d924f7492 (“origin of breach
came from hackers compromising a small number of employee log-in credentials”).
70 How Data Breaches Can Affect Brand and Reputation, VITRIUM (July 23, 2015),
http://blog.vitrium.com/document-security-protection-drm-blog/how-data-breaches-canaffect-brand-and-reputation; OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64.
71 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 1.
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a goldmine of data available to any hacker capable of exploiting network design
flaws if they are not addressed.72 However, NG9-1-1 is one looming
vulnerability in an age soon to be encompassed by integrated big data collection
networks.73
B. Smart Cities and NG9-1-1
NG9-1-1 is a significant step in the ongoing process of integrating technology
into the infrastructure of cities during a time of increasingly significant
urbanization.74 With over 50 percent of the global population living in cities, the
efficiency in which people and their environment interact needs improvement.75
Smart cities are envisioned to be “environmentally sustainable, provide efficient
transportation, have efficient use of resources, improved urban planning, and
enhanced public safety.”76 Such vastly improved efficiency will be, in part, the
product of big data analytics, and there is no doubt that the improved efficiency
that smart cities promise to bring are necessary.77 Among those benefits, there
will be an integration of NG9-1-1 within smart cities planning and
development.78
While definitions vary, generally a smart city is “a municipality that uses
information and communication technologies to increase operational efficiency,
share information with the public and improve both the quality of government
services and citizen welfare.”79 Although the improved operational efficiency of
cities is necessary, and even critical to the further development of society, 80
there are a number of significant risks that must be addressed, and continually
updated as societal and technological transformations occur.81 Given the
72 Reinhard Ekl et al., NG9-1-1 Standards and Best Practices Conference, Smart Cities
and NG9-1-1, NENA, http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.nena.org/resource/resmgr/sbp/
20180118_0800%E2%80%931000_Smart_Cit.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2018).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of
Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 315 (2017).
78 Reinhard Ekl et al., supra note 72; see also Hiller & Blanke, supra note 77
(describing the use of big data in the engineering of smart cities).
79 Margaret Rouse, What is smart city? – Definition from WhatIs.com, IOT AGENDA,
http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/smart-city (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
80 Hiller & Blanke, supra note 77, at 311-12, 317 (describing the advantages of data
collection in smart cities).
81 See Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 107-09 (2018) (discussing smart city movement to data
algorithm use as discriminatory, erroneous, or otherwise problematic); Hiller & Blanke,
supra note 77, at 311-12, 317 (addressing how to define and protect privacy when using big
data for smart cities).
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significant number of components required to feed massive quantities of data for
operational efficiency, it is clear that the transition to smart cities will not occur
overnight. In fact, the transition is well underway, as evident by NG9-1-1 system
initiatives.82 For that reason, the implications of an unsecure NG9-1-1 network
could have detrimental consequences.
If an NG9-1-1 network were crippled by a cyber-attack, the effects may be
significantly amplified within the context of a smart city, and similarly, if a
network within a smart city were compromised, NG9-1-1 networks may be
placed in a more vulnerable position.83 This crippling effect is because all of
these advanced data systems rely extensively on IP-based network integration,
the complexity of which results in the potential for cyber vulnerabilities.84 For
example, in 2017, just days before the inauguration of President Trump,
Romanian hackers installed malware on D.C. police computers, requiring the
police to disable about 70 percent of D.C. security cameras for several days
while the malware was removed.85 Other attacks around the world include the
2015 cyber-attacks on Ukrainian energy companies by suspected Russian
hackers, and a cyber-attack on a terminal of India’s “largest container port,”
82 Chris Bousquet, Data-Driven Emergency Response: Learning from Hurricanes
Harvey and Irma, DATA-SMART CITY SOLUTIONS (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/data-driven-emergency-response-learningfrom-hurricanes-harvey-and-irma-113 (describing the current and needed development of
technology to address citizen needs during hurricanes); Ekl et al., supra note 72 (depicting
use of IoT data in NG 9-1-1 calls today).
83 Anuradha Shukla, Are Smart Cities Prepared For Cyber Attacks?, BUSINESSWORLD
(July 11, 2017), http://businessworld.in/article/Are-Smart-Cities-Prepared-For-CyberAttacks-/11-07-2017-121886; see also Julia Ainsley, Two Romanians arrested for hacking
into 123 D.C. police surveillance cameras before inauguration, NBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2017,
7:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/two-romanians-arrested-hacking123-d-c-police-surveillance-cameras-n833346 (describing cyberattack of police department
computers used for camera surveillance); Mary Scott Nabers, Smart City Security: Atlanta
Cyberattack Cripples City, IOT WORLD TODAY (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.iotworldtoday.com/2018/04/05/smart-city-security-atlanta-cyberattackcripples-city/ (describing cyberattack on Atlanta electronic records and need for smart city
security).
84 Poul Nielsen, Smart City Security and Cyber Attacks, INFO. SEC. BUZZ NEWS (Feb. 25,
2016),
https://www.informationsecuritybuzz.com/articles/smart-city-security-and-cyber-attacks
(hypothesizing domino effect in which many city operations can be compromised in a
cyberattack); NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, NENA NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 SECURITY
(NG-SEC) INFORMATION DOCUMENT 15 (2016) (providing guidance on securing IP
networks used for NG9-1-1 security).
85 Ainsley, supra note 83; Kim Crawley, Washington DC Surveillance Cameras
Infected by Ransomware, THREAT VECTOR (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/washington-dc-surveillance-cameras-infectedby-ransomware.html (detailing ransomware used in cyberattack on D.C. police video
cameras); Shukla, supra note 83.

2018]NG9-1-1, Cybersecurity & Contributions to the Model Framework

139

debilitating one of its essential terminals.86 Attacks on public safety, critical
infrastructure, and commercial sectors, evidence the risk of significant exposure
caused by malicious actors intending to do harm.
What makes such vulnerability far more dangerous is the breadth of the attack.
If hackers are capable of deleting footage stored on nearly an entire city’s
security camera footage—what would stop the same hackers from turning all the
traffic lights in a city green?87 On the other hand, what if a worker at a local
energy company accidently downloads malware into the fully integrated electric
grid, possibly disabling the ability to call a local PSAP? A hacker may as easily
reroute calls from one PSAP’s jurisdiction to another with the intent of causing
mass confusion in the wake of something more sinister, such as a terrorist
attack.88 Therefore, because NG9-1-1 and other IP-based communication
technologies will be fully integrated within a futuristic smart city environment,
they must be designed by taking security into account throughout development
in order to reduce vulnerabilities.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE RISK OF IP-BASED NETWORKS
Your awareness of a medical emergency triggers your call to 9-1-1. You pick
up your smartphone and begin instinctively dialing, but unexpectedly, the line is
dead. Upon a second attempt from your cell phone with the same result, you may
try using a landline to no avail. Panicked, you attempt to drive your critically
injured neighbor to the hospital, which also happens to be in disarray. Without
access to 9-1-1 dispatchers, a society that has become reliant on virtual
communication is rendered lost.89 Such a scenario may be the result of a large
scale cyber-attack on an NG9-1-1 network with lapses in cybersecurity
preparedness.90 Per Murphy’s law, if something can go wrong, it will.91 In the
digital age, there is an ever-present risk that malicious actors may exploit
Shukla, supra note 83.
Faiz Siddiqui, Can hackers take over traffic lights?, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/could-a-hacker-gain-control-of-dcs-trafficsystem/2015/08/08/7cb7cf94-201a-11e5-bf41-c23f5d3face1_story.html?utm_term
=.1ea3be697522 (recounting hackers turning traffic lights from red to green).
88 David Raths, Increased Connectivity Brings Cybersecurity Threats to 911 Call
Centers, EMERGENCY MGMT., Fall 2016, at 30, 31 (discussing ability of PSAPs to reroute
calls, but the switch to NG9-1-1 brings more vulnerabilities).
89 Kevin Rector, Baltimore 911 dispatch system hacked, investigation underway,
officials confirm, BALT. SUN (Mar. 27, 2018, 7:00 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-911-hacked-20180327story.html (describing hacking of 911 call center and switch to analog services).
90 Traci Knight, Improving the Cybersecurity Posture of NG911 Systems, SAFECOM
(Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/safecom/blog/2016/04/01/improving-cybersecurityposture-ng911-systems.
91 Murphy’s Law, WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1996).
86
87
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network vulnerabilities.92 Fortunately, NG9-1-1 presents the opportunity to
learn from past cyber threats and create a secure IP-based communications
network.93
The first step in analyzing risk is to identify possible threats one may
encounter.94 NENA succinctly states:
IP networks were developed to foster resilient connectivity but not
security. IP multimedia services are easy targets because they are based
on IP networks that are inherently insecure. IP was also developed to be
flexible, so there are many types of services within today’s
infrastructure that have been built on top of IP over time. Once you
transition to NG9-1-1 you rely on these IP networks to deliver
Emergency Services.95
While NG9-1-1 possesses many capabilities that subvert the risk of operating
on vulnerable IP-based networks (such as the ability to transfer calls from a
PSAP that is experiencing a loss of operational capability to a functional PSAP
in another jurisdiction), the constant and evolving nature of cyber threats and
criminal capability ensures an ever-present risk.96 In an integrated network, an
individual system may seem secure.97 However, vulnerabilities may be present,
providing a litany of ways for criminals or state actors to gain access and exploit
internet devices and applications.98 Crypting services used to encrypt malware
can be used to hide viruses within systems for significant amounts of time with
no clear alert.99 Hacking technology can be purchased at an affordable cost and
is therefore easily accessible.100 A hacker may gain access to a seemingly secure
network by exploiting the network connection using tactics such as “gathering
intelligence—often through social engineering, implanting backdoors,
strengthening control and access of the target’s network, exfiltrating data for as
92 PABLO GUTIERREZ ASTILLEROS ET AL., CYBERSECURITY: GUIDELINES AND BEST
PRACTICES FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES 3 (2018); Dave Piscatello, Threats, Vulnerabilities
and Exploits - oh my!, ICANN (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/threatsvulnerabilities-and-exploits-oh-my (explaining the concepts of threats, vulnerabilities in
exploitation related to the field of cybersecurity).
93 Knight, supra note 90.
94 Risk Analysis and Risk Management, MINDTOOLS,
https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_07.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
95 NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, supra note 84.
96 ASTILLEROS ET AL., supra note 92; NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, supra note 84,
at 16; NG9-1-1 Project, supra note 35.
97 Scott Goolik, 8 Cyber Security Vulnerabilities: Know Your Enemy, SYMMETRY (May
19, 2016), https://symmetrycorp.com/blog/8-cyber-security-vulnerabilities.
98 Id.; see ASTILLEROS ET AL., supra note 92, at 14.
99 Goolik, supra note 97.
100 Id. (discussing affordable software such as Remote Administration Tools (RAT),
Keyloggers, and Ransomware).
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long as they can, [and then] covering their tracks.”101
Moreover, there is a distinct cyber vulnerability in PSAPs, particularly in the
quantity of PSAPs, possessing insufficient resources required to effectively
mitigate cyber vulnerabilities.102 According to Chris Patti, a technical writer for
ComTech Telecommunications, “Cybersecurity is—by its very nature—an
ongoing, ever-evolving, long-term process. There is no ‘magic bullet’ that will
instantly whip an organization’s networks (and its users) into shape.”103 Because
PSAPs are critical to the function of NG9-1-1 systems, it is of equal importance
that they are secure.104 According to public safety expert Mike Beagles, PSAPs
present a unique cyber vulnerability; “There are more than 6,000 PSAPs located
across the country, and 80 percent of them are small, making them unlikely to
have adequate cyber security defense programs.”105 Given the nature of NG9-11, and the interoperability of ESI-networks and PSAPs, the security that an
individual PSAP has will only protect the network to a certain extent.106 Security
policies must be implemented to significantly decrease the risk of losing PSAP
operational capabilities. Any PSAP policy that is implemented must focus on
developing expertise in the foundational practices and basics of network
security.107 Additionally, because PSAPs throughout the country have
significant variances in resources, any implementation must also be realistic.108
At the heart of any information security policy should be the CIA triad:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.109

Id.
APCO INT’L, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERSECURITY: A GUIDE FOR PSAPS 8 (2016);
see Beagles, supra note 18.
103 Chris Patti, Top 5 Cybersecurity Practices for PSAPs, COMTECH (Aug. 8, 2015, 7:00
AM), http://i.telecomsys.com/blog/top-5-cybersecurity-practices-for-psaps.
104 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64; Beagles, supra note 18.
105 Beagles, supra note 18.
106 NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, What is NG911?, EMS1 (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.ems1.com/ems-products/communications/articles/588619-What-is-NG911/
(explaining that ESI-networks carry different types of data using hierarchical design to
support emergency management authorities).
107 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 10 (describing
recommended actions to improve NG9-1-1 systems).
108 NAT’L EMERGENCY NUMBER ASS’N, A Policy Maker Blueprint for Transitioning to
the Next Generation 9-1-1 System 6-7 (Sept. 2008),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nena.org/resource/collection/B6781C63-012C-4E90-939B001733976BBC/Policy_Maker_Blueprint_for_Transition_to_NG9-1-1.pdf (discussing
planning and coordination by local, state and federal government to fund NG9-1-1 services).
109 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 3; Philip Favro et al., The
New Information Governance Playbook for Addressing Digital Age Threats, 23 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 33 (2017).
101
102
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A. Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability, also known as the CIA Triad
(CIA), are the guiding principles for information and network security policies,
which can form the basis of PSAP security.110 Confidentiality refers to the
accessibility of information in a system.111 First, applying password protections,
utilizing encryption services, and ensuring that data is accessed only by those
who have clearance is central to confidentiality.112 Secondly, “Integrity means
that attackers cannot change or destroy information in a computer or network
without detection and that changed or destroyed information can be restored.”113
Lastly, the availability of data focuses on having the ability to access data
instantly.114 Consistent maintenance of software and hardware will ensure that
data will be available.115 By using the triad as an evaluative tool, PSAPs can
focus on the very basics of security with greater efficiency.116 The Department
of Homeland Security elaborates on PSAP cyber security utilizing the CIA triad,
stating:
Loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability has especially severe
impacts in the emergency response domain. For example, loss of
confidentiality within NG911 systems could expose information to
identity thefts or disrupt ongoing investigations; loss of integrity could
disrupt response to 911 calls; and loss of availability could prevent
urgent
requests
from
reaching
a
PSAP.117
The cyber security threats to NG9-1-1 networks stems from vulnerabilities
present in devices and equipment, network infrastructure and connections, and
data, applications, and services.118 A cybersecurity response must “mitigate[e]
110 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 3; Loren F. Selznick &
Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity: Should the SEC be Sticking its Nose Under this Tent,
2016 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 35, 65 (2016).
111 44 U.S.C § 3542(b)(1)(B) (defining confidentiality as “preserving authorized
restrictions on access and disclosure” of information and information systems).
112 CIA Triad of Information Security, TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/25830/cia-triad-of-information-security (last visited
Nov. 26, 2018).
113 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 3; Selznick &
LaMacchia, supra note 110.
114 See Philip Robinson, CIA triad – The Basic Principles of Data Security, LEPIDE BLOG
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.lepide.com/blog/cia-triad-the-basic-principals-of-data-security/
(discussing data integrity and its availability).
115 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 8; Favro et al., supra
note 109, at 36.
116 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 3.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 5.
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risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deter threats, and minimize[e]
consequences.”119 PSAPs of the future realistically cannot be entirely secure.
Cyber breaches and illegal access to PSAPs will inevitably happen due to a
variety of circumstances, including faults in security, mistakes, poor cyber
hygiene, and malicious actors.120 By following basic cybersecurity protocols,
PSAPs will be able to mitigate risks, and decrease the fallout from major
incidents.121 PSAPs should follow basic cybersecurity protocols promulgated by
the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.122
B. NIST Framework
NIST points out in its Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity, “[t]he Framework is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing
cybersecurity risk for critical infrastructure. Organizations will continue to have
unique risks—different threats, different vulnerabilities, different risk
tolerances—and how they implement the practices in the Framework will
vary.”123 The goal of this framework is to provide a technologically neutral
approach to implement best practices for cyber security.124
The “Framework Core” is a set of five underlying principles meant to be
considered in the implementation of dynamic best practices.125 The five
underlying principles are: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.126
Identify is a function focused on developing “an organizational understanding
to manage cybersecurity risk to systems, people, assets, data, and
capabilities.”127 “The Protect Function supports the ability to limit or contain the
impact of a potential cybersecurity event,” with specific focus on cybersecurity
awareness and training, data security, information protection processes and
procedures, and other protective technologies.128 “The Detect Function enables

119 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, National Infrastructure Protection Plan 7 (2009)
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.
120 Id.; OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 4.
121 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 8.
122 See generally NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., Framework for Improving Critical
Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf (explaining that each
organization will have individual risks, but that the Framework will help reduce them).
123 Id. at 2.
124 Id. at 4.
125 Id. at 4.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 8.
128 Id.
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timely discovery of cybersecurity events.”129 Responding to cybersecurity
events requires the implementation of appropriate activities regarding detection
thereof.130 Recovery consists of developing and maintain a systems resiliency
and capability to restore “any capabilities or services that were impaired due to
a cybersecurity event.”131
By implementing the NIST cyber-security framework, PSAP’s can ensure a
high level of security through diligence in updating standards, and recognition
of new threats.132 NG9-1-1 requires consistent security, that also detects everevolving cyber threats.133 While the security of NG9-1-1 has certainly received
recognition, and standards are in place to identify and solve technical issues,
PSAPs and ESInets, along with all Voice Over Internet Protocol
Communications, still remain vulnerable.134 The policies and administrative
agencies that are charged with ensuring the security for NG9-1-1 must ensure
security protocols in the evolution of NG9-1-1.
IV. NG9-1-1 LEGISLATION
In November 2017, Congress introduced the Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of
2017 (the Act) to support and aid the deployment of nationwide NG9-1-1
systems.135 The policy goals of the Act include creating “seamless
interoperability between PSAPs;”136 maintaining State, regional, and local levels
of control; the promotion of “increased compatibility”; and the “functional
interconnection of the nation’s 9-1-1 systems with the wireless nationwide
public safety broadband network being deployed by the First Responder
Network Authority.”137 Many PSAPs have already commenced transition to the
IP-based NG9-1-1 systems.138 While the Act calls for increased action on critical
issues facing the implementation of NG9-1-1, such as cybersecurity, there are
practical barriers facing NG9-1-1, namely funding considerations for PSAPs.139
Increased federal support to PSAPs is necessary if the substance of the Act is to
Id.
Id. at 11.
131 Id. at 9.
132 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 6.
133 Id. at 10.
134 NG9-1-1 Project, supra note 35.
135 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 1.
136 Id. at § 4.
137 Id. at § 2.
138 Adam Stone, PSAPs Move Ahead with Next-Generation 911 as Carriers Lag,
EMERGENCY MGMT. (June 28, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/em/next-gen-911/PSAPsMove-Ahead-with-Next-Generation-911-as-Carriers-Lag.html.
139 Id.; S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 2.
129
130
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be realized.
A. The Next Generation 9-1-1 Act Implementation
The Act is a necessary piece of proposed legislation to provide guidance and
funding, to ensure an effective rollout of NG9-1-1 nationwide.140 The Act first
acknowledges that nationwide framework is “essential to help guide the
transition” to NG9-1-1, while still maintaining the need to preserve “[s]tate,
regional, and local control over the governance and technology choices of the
Nation’s 9-1-1 systems.”141 Maintaining localized control is a primary policy
point of the Act.142 This is because 9-1-1 is a state-provided emergency call
network and each state has their own model by which they operate emergency
response systems.143 It is a localized system, and many PSAPs have not been
significantly updated since the 1970s.144 The Act addresses the significant
vulnerabilities inherent in IP-based networks.145 However, without a more
effective implementation of federal efforts and funding, NG9-1-1 will fall victim
to the very same discrepancies of the current 9-1-1 system and lag behind in
many areas of the country.146 The National 9-1-1 program analyzed a survey of
states transitioning to NG9-1-1, stating:
about half of states were transitioning to NG911 in 2015, but that state
S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 6.
Id. at § 2.
142 Id. at § 6.
143 See NAT’L. HIGHWAY AND SAFETY TRAFFIC ADMIN., GUIDELINES FOR STATE NG9-1-1,
10 (2012), https://www.911.gov/pdf/National_911_Program_Model_Guidelines_State_
NG911_Legislative_Language_2012.pdf.
144 Mark Fletcher, The Truth about 911: How Outdated Technology is Putting Your Life
at Risk, AVAYA (July 22, 2016), https://www.avaya.com/blogs/archives/2015/07/the-truthabout-911-how-outdated-technology-is-putting-your-life-at-risk.html.
145 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 2; David Simpson, Creating a Culture of Cybersecurity in
America’s 911 Call Centers, FCC BLOG (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.fcc.gov/newsevents/blog/2016/01/28/creating-culture-cybersecurity-america’s-911-call-centers
(explaining IP-based systems “can also introduce new vulnerabilities and expose 911
systems to cyber threats that didn’t exist in the legacy 911 environment.”).
146 See 911.GOV, Current State of 911 Funding and Oversight, at 1 (2008),
https://www.911.gov/pdf/National_911_Program_Current_State_911_Funding_Oversight_2
013.pdf (explaining “current 911 funding is unstable and inadequate to support the
migration to NG911.”); Discussion Draft To Provide Funding for the Construction and
Maintenance of a Nationwide, Interoperable Public Safety Broadband Network and for
Other Purposes and on H.R. 4829, the Next Generation 911 Preservation Act of 2010
Before the H. Subcomm. on Comm., Tech., and the Internet of the Comm. on Energy and
Com., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher, H.R. Committee on Energy
and Commerce) (maintaining “The largest single challenge to creating the first responder
network is identifying and obtaining the funding that is needed for the buying, the
installation, the operating, and the maintaining of the equipment that will provide broadband
communications.”).
140
141

146

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 27.1

and local progress varied. 10 states reported that all 911 authorities in
their state processed calls using NG911 systems. 18 states reported
having no state or local NG911 transition plans in place, which indicates
that these states were in early planning stages or had not yet begun.147
Although the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA)
is leading efforts to ensure the implementation of NG9-1-1 is supported at a
federal level, the fundamental issue of uneven implementation will persist.148
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has called upon NHSTA to
“develop performance measures and goals to assess how the initiative meets its
mission in supporting the implementation of the Next Generation 911
system.”149 The greatest challenge facing federal agencies working to ensure
effective rollout of NG9-1-1 are the various discrepancies between states and
regions within states.150 For example, the National Association of State 9-1-1
Administrators (NASNA) examined the authority that statewide 9-1-1 programs
possessed in the implementation, and control over their networks.151 The study
recognizes that state 9-1-1 programs are generally created by state legislatures,
and that not all states even have 9-1-1 programs.152 The study also revealed that
24 states did not possess the level of oversight or enforcement necessary to
ensure funds secured via state tax or revenue streams for 9-1-1 are actually
allocated to 9-1-1 services.153 In fact, the allocation of 9-1-1 funds to other state
functions is a fraudulent act that has been plaguing state 9-1-1 agencies for over
a decade.154 Although Congress is attempting to ensure proper federal oversight
147 Kevin Randolph, GAO reviews Next Generation 911 implementation nationwide
ahead of roadmap development, HOMELAND PREPAREDNESS NEWS (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/26999-gao-reviews-next-generation-911implementation-nationwide-ahead-roadmap-development.
148 Final Report of TFOPA Working Group 3, TASK FORCE ON OPTIMAL PUB. SAFETY
ANSWERING POINT ARCHITECTURE (TFOPA), WASHINGTON UTILS. AND TRANSP. COMM’N, at
5 (Sept. 28, 2018).
149 Edwards, supra note 4.
150 NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. 9-1-1 ADMINS, FOUR POTENTIAL SUSTAINABLE FUNDING MODELS
FOR NG911, at 13 (2015).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 11.
153 Id. at 13; see Elaine Seeman et al, The First Step in Modernizing our 911 Emergency
Call Centers: Revising the Sate Enhanced (E) 911 Legislative Funding Scheme to Efficiently
Distribute 911 Funds, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y., 289, 298 (2012) (explaining North
Carolina’s 9-1-1 funding formula was based off the “ill-fated assumption” that “local
governments would spend their annual 911 fund distributions” but instead the states
accumulated large surpluses for “unspecified purposes”).
154 Michael O’Rielly, States Must Stop Raiding 9-1-1 Fees, FED. COMM. COMMISSION
(Mar. 1, 2017, 4:52 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2017/03/01/states-muststop-raiding-9-1-1-fees#_ftn1 (explaining that some states “divert fees collected for
legitimate and needed 9-1-1 communications capabilities to unrelated purposes” and that the
FCC has been dealing with the problem for almost fifteen years); see also COMM. ON
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for the implementation of NG9-1-1, the very localized nature of 9-1-1 is the
greatest barrier to overcome in achieving a secure 9-1-1 network.155 Increased
federal oversight is vital to ensure NG9-1-1 is not only implemented, but also
secured. 9-1-1 networks did not effectively address the risk of cyber-attacks due
to the “closed network function” of their systems. However, with integrated IPbased networks, the level of oversight to ensure maximum operability and
security of call networks need to increase.156
B. Cybersecurity and the NG9-1-1 Act
Continually, cybersecurity has received a significant amount of national
attention. From Facebook’s violation of user trust, to President Trump’s
Executive Order to strengthen the cybersecurity of federal networks and critical
infrastructure, all evidences not only a national but international need to secure
networks and data.157 The Act has placed an emphasis on cybersecurity, noting
the risk of threats posed to PSAPs and next generation networks.158 It is critical
COMMERCE, SCI., & TRANSP., THE ENHANCED 911 EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF
2003, S. REP. NO. 108-130, at 3 (2003) (“Recently, State lawmakers and administrators have
[…] discovered instances in which E–911 funds have been used for purposes other than the
provision of E–911 service. Observers claim as many as 11 States have been ‘raiding’ their
collected E–911 funds to satisfy other State obligations.”).
155 NAT’L ASS’N OF ST. 9-1-1 ADMINS, supra note 150, at 10 (discussing how Congress
can use Federal grants to provide for funding and oversight in implementation of NG911);
see S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 3 (stating that “a nationwide strategy for Next Generation 9-1-1
services has become essential to help guide the transition and create a common framework
for implementation of Next Generation 9-1-1 services,” and as such Congress is enacting
legislation to achieve this goal).
156 See Jay English, Cybersecurity and the PSAP, APCO INST. (Mar. 2014),
https://www.apcointl.org/doc/training-certification-1/481-cde-36485-cybersecurity-and-thepsap/file.html (explaining that “new concerns are emerging about the safety of the 9-1-1
closed-loop system, as we are discovering that the ‘loop’ may not be quite as ‘closed’ as
we’ve always thought”).
157 WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE ORDER ON STRENGTHENING THE
CYBERSECURITY OF FEDERAL NETWORKS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2017) (explaining
that “the President will hold heads of executive departments and agencies (agency heads)
accountable for managing cybersecurity risk to their enterprises” and that “because risk
management decisions made by agency heads can affect the risk to the executive branch as a
whole, and to national security, it is also the policy of the United States to manage
cybersecurity risk as an executive branch enterprise”); Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham
Harrison, Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in
major data breach, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influenceus-election (“The data analytics firm that worked with Donald Trump’s election team and
the winning Brexit campaign harvested millions of Facebook profiles of US voters, in one
of the tech giant’s biggest ever data breaches, and used them to build a powerful software
program to predict and influence choices at the ballot box.”).
158 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 11 (“The Office, in consultation with the Department of
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that the security of NG9-1-1 is not overlooked, and that the NG9-1-1 Act places
the duty of addressing cybersecurity issues on the Department of Homeland
Security, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the FCC.159
Although specific agencies have been delegated the responsibility in assisting
with the implementation of specific standards, the Act designed “nonproprietary,
consensus based standards” while still allotting for state, local, and regional
control.160 Because the Act provides consensus-based standards, local
governments are given the responsibility to ensure that their call networks and
PSAPs are up-to-date and in accordance with those standards.161 As a result, any
nonproprietary security protocols suggested by expert agencies will merely be
left to each state and local government to independently implement either as
local governments see fit, or as governments are capable.162 While it is in the
interest of each state to consistently maintain a security centric approach
regarding its PSAPs, an increase in federal support will play a role in ensuring
consistent funding and support. Without consistent funding and continually
managed security protocols at a local level, PSAPs may lapse in security updates
and be left vulnerable to cyber threats.
While a federal recommendation for cybersecurity will prevent the federal
government from overreaching their regulatory authority, and respect the
autonomy of state governments, it will not ensure effective and consistent
cybersecurity efforts. There are major discrepancies in the status of PSAP
technology throughout the United States.163 The 9-1-1 funding throughout the

Homeland Security and the National Institute for Science and Technology, shall provide
support to States, localities, vendors, and other entities in addressing cybersecurity issues
related to Next Generation 9-1-1 services.”).
159 See OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64, at 6 (explaining that
“the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strongly recommends adopting the NIST
Cybersecurity Framework, which is a flexible, risk based approach to improving the security
of critical infrastructure,” to address NG9-1-1 cybersecurity issues); Knight, supra note 90
(discussing how “NG911 will also introduce new vectors for attack that can disrupt or
disable PSAP operations, broadening the concerns of―and complicating the mitigation and
management of―cyber risks across all levels of government,” and as such, the Department
of Homeland Security Office of Emergency Communications and Department of
Transportation National 911 Program has produced the NG911 Cybersecurity Primer to
address said cybersecurity issues).
160 S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 4.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Raths, supra note 7 (“So far, […] the federal grant funding to help PSAPs transition
to next-generation 911 has been minuscule.”); see Donny Jackson, Public-safety groups
seek federal funds to pay for next-gen 911 (NG911) upgrades, URGENT COMM. (Mar. 21,
2018), http://urgentcomm.com/ng-911/public-safety-groups-seek-federal-funds-pay-nextgen-911-ng911-upgrades (discussing how “in 2012, Congress funded the implementation of
an advanced, interoperable, wireless broadband network for first responders, known as
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country has been subject to frequent misuse.164 These discrepancies, and PSAP’s
uneven deployment of standards-based technology nationwide, are likely to
persist in the absence of meaningful reform in the manner that PSAPs implement
security protocols and network maintenance.165 PSAP jurisdictions receiving
state and federal assistance and grants to effectively implement NG9-1-1
security measures do not present major security risks, however, jurisdictions that
lack funding and resources hindering implementation and regulation of proper
security protocols are at greater risk of experiencing a cyber breach.166
While the initial implementation of NG9-1-1 systems will significantly
improve the security of updated PSAPs, the efforts to update these PSAPs will
have little long-term effect without a consistent and diligent practice of cyber
hygiene and security.167 Suggested standards provide a flexible way for PSAPs
to independently and accurately gauge their own cyber preparedness. However,
in the absence of meaningful federal support, suggested standards will only
continue the uneven implementation of advanced security protocols.168 Future
FirstNet,” and that “the progress of FirstNet highlights the need for Congress to make a
similar investment to modernize the complete emergency communications sector of our
nation’s critical infrastructure by achieving Next Generation 911”).
164 See COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI., AND TRANSP., supra note 154 (“State lawmakers and
administrators have begun investigating the use of E-911 funds, and have discovered
instances in which E–911 funds have been used for purposes other than the provision of E–
911 service.”); see O’Rielly, supra note 154 (“Some states divert fees collected for
legitimate and needed 9-1-1 communications capabilities to unrelated purposes.”).
165 See GALLAGHER, supra note 50 (“NG911 technologies are expected to change the
way 911 systems operate and interoperate. Local 911 systems may need to create or revise
policies to accommodate the new technology. Similarly, with the ability to interconnect
systems, there is potential to create a nationwide 911 system, which may create the need for
new policies to ensure PSAPs are interoperable and secure.”); Elaine Seeman et al., Legal,
Policy and Ethical Issues of Using Big Data and Predictive Analytics in Next Generation
(NG) 911 to Notify and Aid the Dispatch of First Responders, 25 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
547, 557 (2015) (“Notwithstanding the benefits of more NG911 data and information, the
collection and delivery of these data and information by telecommunication carriers, 911
service providers, PSAPs and first responder agencies [without proper security protocols in
place] raise legal, ethical, and public policy issues to provide emergency services.”).
166 See GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 4 (“Each PSAP uses different technologies, is in
different phases of upgrade, and is dependent on different sources of funding. […] As a
result, there is variability in 911 levels of services [, such as security services,] across
jurisdictions.”); James E. Holloway et al., Federalism in the Financing of 911 Emergency
Call Services: Nature of the Federal-State Funding Arrangement to Finance Next
Generation (NG) 911 Services, 5 J. L., TECH. & INTERNET 113, 126 (2014) (discussing how
“NG911 funding arrangements must permit states to govern essential […] information
management and technology interests and objectives needed to provide NG911 services,”
including security).
167 GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 10.
168 Next Generation 9-1-1 Act of 2017, H.R. 4672, 115th Cong. §2 (2017); Realizing
Nationwide Next-Generation 911 Before the Subcomm. on Commc’n and Tech. of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. 3-4 (2017) (opening statement of Rep.
Marsha Blackburn, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commc’n and Tech.); GALLAGHER, supra note
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PSAPs must possess the resources to ensure that standards are consistently met
and security is “baked in by design.”169 In the event PSAP security protocols
lapse significantly, a malevolent cyber actor will undoubtedly possess the
capability to inflict great harm upon the PSAP networks. As a recent
congressional report pointed out: “[w]hile there is a national interest in
promoting consistent cybersecurity policies across all PSAPs, there are no
mechanisms in place to require state and local adoption of these best practices,
which may present a risk to the NG911 network and the systems to which they
interconnect.”170
The increased resiliency of next generation systems is due to their
interoperability, which happens to significantly increase the risk that an attack
on one PSAP may have an effect on another interconnected PSAP.171 PSAP
interoperability is a reference to a multitude of next generation capabilities,
allowing PSAPs to “seamlessly (1) receive calls and related data from
origination networks, (2) share calls and related data among connecting ESInets,
including across state boundaries, and (3) hand off calls and related data with
each other.”172 Because NG9-1-1 interoperability is expected to be implemented
first regionally, and then nationally, it is time “to adopt common technical
standards that will enable interoperability,” as well as security.173
V. NG9-1-1 SYSTEMS IN THE AGGREGATE: A FUNDING CRISIS
Because PSAPs operate on a state, regional, and local level, the challenge is
unique in ensuring nationwide PSAP security. According to NENA, “as of
December 2017, the United States [had] 5,783 primary and secondary
PSAPs.”174 Many PSAPs will not make the transition from current 9-1-1 systems
to NG9-1-1 without federal assistance.175 The NG9-1-1 Act proposes sustainable
funding models.176 However, while current funding helps move PSAPs to next
generation technology, it is not sufficient to protect PSAPs nationwide.177
50, at 5.
169 ASTILLEROS & MERTKA, supra note 92, at 32.
170 GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 10.
171 Id. at 8.
172 ASS’N OF P UBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
to Revise Regulations for the 911 Grant Program Under the Next Generation 911
Advancement Act of 2012 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
NTIA-2017-0002-0010.
173 GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 8.
174 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 21.
175 911.GOV, supra note 14.
176 H.R. 4672, 115th Cong., § 6(a)(2)(C).
177 911.GOV, supra note 14.
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Diverting fees from underfunded 9-1-1 centers can “lead to understaffed calling
centers, longer wait times in an emergency, and sluggish dispatch for public
safety personnel. It also will slow the ability of 9-1-1 call centers to update their
systems to support digital age technologies.”178 Although federal assistance
programs, particularly the current multi-agency NG9-1-1 grant program, will
provide essential funding to assist with the implementation of NG9-1-1, the
implementation is only the first step in upgrading and enhancing nationwide 91-1 networks.179 Once PSAP’s are operating on NG9-1-1 systems, their
advanced capabilities and connectivity will create a perpetual cyber risk on a
large scale if the necessary funding is not secured and then maintained.180
The ultimate goal of the NG9-1-1 legislation is a nationwide deployment of
9-1-1 and PSAPs.181 Through successful federal support, nearly 6,000 PSAPs in
the United States would be upgraded to next generation networks.182 This means
each of the 6,000 PSAPs integrated with IP-based networks will be left
vulnerable to the same threats as any other IP-based network.183 However, each
individual PSAP’s capabilities will likely vary due to discrepancies in
funding.184 Although some PSAPs will implement secure networks, and conduct
routine protocols to safeguard their ESI-networks, many PSAPs will likely
receive inadequate funding and resources to maintain secure networks and will
not have the capability to detect and prevent cyber threats.185 Even if a
sustainable funding model can be created and executed, the local nature of 9-11 guarantees that the actual implementation will vary.186 9-1-1 systems in the

178 Michael O’Reilly & Jessica Rosenworcel, States are stealing funds from 9-1-1
emergency services — now they’ll be punished, THE HILL (Feb. 9, 2018),
http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/373043-states-are-stealing-funds-from-9-1-1emergency-services-now-theyll-be; Jean Turgeon, When is Enough Actually Enough? A
Hard Look at the Lagging Face of Public Safety (Part 1), AVAYA (Sept. 13, 2016),
https://www.avaya.com/blogs/archives/2016/09/a-hard-look-at-the-lagging-face-of-publicsafety-part-1.html.
179 911.GOV, supra note 14.
180 OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 64; see also Knight, supra note
90 (highlighting the range of risks potentially involved with NG911 and suggestions for
possible mitigations of mentioned risks).
181 See S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 3.
182 9-1-1 Statistics, supra note 21; see also S. 2061, 115th Cong. § 2 (proposing
accelerated implementation of NG-911 services to upgrade networks therefore increasing
compatibility with emerging technologies).
183 Raths, supra note 88, at 2; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 8-10 (listing the
possible setbacks to nationwide deployment of NG911, and the funding issues states are
currently facing trying to decide which version of 911 to fund).
184 Raths, supra note 88; see also GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 7 (positing the different
outcomes various types of funding programs may have on the NG911 roll-out and upkeep
efforts).
185 Raths, supra note 88.
186 See GALLAGHER, supra note 50, at 7.
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United States need certainty regarding the future security of their networks.
In 2016, former FCC Chairman, Tom Wheeler recognized the need for
Congressional action in NG9-1-1 implementation for PSAPs in a statement
made before the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology of the
United States House of Representatives during a hearing on the “Oversight of
the Federal Communications Commission.”187 During this hearing, he presented
three points to help with the implementation and operation of NG9-1-1 and
PSAPs.188 First, Chairman Wheeler called for a National 9-1-1 map to “eliminate
the seams between commercial communications network infrastructure and
emergency response dispatch systems.”189 Although this would provide clarity
to the actual operational capability and mapping of PSAPs nationwide, this
comment will focus on the latter two points. Second, Chairman Wheeler
recognized the inability of PSAPs to keep up with cyber defense and called for
bringing PSAPs under the protective wing of DHS’s “Einstein Program” to
centralize security efforts.190 Third, Chairman Wheeler called for a national
timetable, or target date, for completing the transition to NG9-1-1.191 By
implementing Chairman Wheeler’s vision of federal support for PSAP’s and
their implementation and operation of NG9-1-1, the emergency call network of
the future can be a success.
A. Federal Funding of Public Safety Initiatives
The NG9-1-1 grant program is a joint effort between the National
Telecommunications Industry Administration (NTIA) and NHSTA.192 The
program, authorized under the NG9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012,193 allocated
about “$115 million from spectrum auction proceeds” for NTIA and NHSTA to
support the PSAP transition to NG9-1-1.194 States that participate in this program
187 Hearings, supra note 9; see also Suresh Gursahaney, FCC Chairmen Calls for
NG911 Funding and Support for PSAPs, MICROAUTOMATION (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.microautomation.com/new-blog/fcc-chairman-calls-for-ng9-1-1-funding-andsupport-for-psaps (summarizing Chairman Wheeler’s comments to Congress).
188 Hearings, supra note 9.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.; see also Gursahaney, supra note 187 (summarizing the requests of Chairman
Wheeler while before Congress).
192 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 9-1-1 GRANT PROGRAM (2017),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/nhtsa_ntia_ng911_grant_program_manage
ment_plan.pdf.
193 Next Generation 9-1-1 Advancement Act of 2012, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1473 (2018).
194 911 Grant Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 44131 (proposed Sept. 21, 2017) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 400).
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are permitted to use funds from the program for the “adoption and operation of
NG911 services and applications; and the implementation of IP-enabled
emergency services and applications enabled by NG911 services, including the
establishment of IP backbone networks and the application layer software
infrastructure needed to interconnect the multitude of emergency response
organizations.”195 The maximum amount of funds allotted through the program
are “$500,000 per state and $250,000 per territory,” and although funds were
expected to be awarded in early 2018, none have been awarded to date.196
Although the 9-1-1 grant program addresses the issue of underfunded PSAPs,
commenters on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the 9-1-1 grant
program have expressed concern that the amount of funding available will only
allow “marginal enhancements in any given area.”197 Other public safety
associations have suggested alternative funding initiatives to efficiently use the
available money.198 For example, APCO has gained support for their proposal
to focus funding initiatives on specific facilities to create model PSAPs and spur
statewide deployment.199 In their reply comment to the NPRM, APCO states:
[T]he best way to use these grants is to create model deployments that
demonstrate proofs of concept for fully-deployed and interoperable
NG911 services in urban, suburban, and rural areas. By focusing on
model NG911 deployments for a few areas, the grant program can better
serve the entire country by producing blueprints for efficiently
modernizing 911 systems nationwide. This should lower costs and
speed implementations for systems that follow.200
APCO continues to state that interoperability (“meaning PSAPs can
seamlessly (1) receive calls and related data from origination networks, (2) share

Wood, supra note 13.
Id.; see also 911 Grant Program, supra note 14 (outlining the two-stage application
process and various requirements and stating that “NHTSA and NTIA will review all
complete application packets and will then make awards”).
197 Paul Kirby, Public Safety, Industry Entities Weigh in on NG-911 Grant Program,
NAT’L PUB. SAFETY TELECOMM. COUNCIL (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://blog.npstc.org/2017/11/07/public-safety-industry-entities-weigh-in-on-ng-911-grantprogram; ASS’N OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, supra note 172.
198 See Kirby, supra note 197 (stating that the National Association of State 911
Administrators, The Colorado Public Utilities Commission, and other similar organizations
are seeking clarification on the grant process to reduce confusion regarding state funding
limits, and to reduce the potential that grant-seekers within the same states submit redundant
applications); see also ASS’N OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, supra note 172.
199 See generally Jackson, supra note 163 (quoting FirstNet’s Dave Buchanan, stating
that the organization received “great feedback . . . [at their suggestion to make] call centers,
PSAPs and those employees that work at PSAPs amongst those who have the priority and
preemption in the top tier of eligible users”).
200 Kirby, supra note 197; ASS’N OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, supra note
172.
195
196
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calls and related data among connecting ESInets, including across state
boundaries, and (3) hand off calls and related data with each other”) must remain
a top priority and proposes to condition the grant of funding on “achieving and
maintaining interoperability.”201 If the local government fails to obtain this
objective, the conditional funding must be returned back to the grant fund.202
While ideally, the NG9-1-1 grant program will be capable of sufficiently
supporting PSAPs nationwide, without additional funding,203 APCO’s proposal
is likely the most efficient way to leverage funding for the full implementation
of NG9-1-1.204
Although direct federal assistance for the implementation of NG9-1-1 in
PSAPs would present an impracticable challenge, there may be alternative ways
for the federal government to effectively aid in the implementation of NG9-1-1
on a local level.205 Another public safety communications program may serve as
a model or provide valuable lessons for the provision of federal assistance to
local public safety networks.206 Specifically, the First Responder Emergency
Network is an example of a federally sanctioned public safety initiative
providing direct support to state and local governments.207
While 9-1-1 inherently operates locally, the federal funding of local initiatives
is not a foreign concept and FirstNet is the prime example of federal support for
local public safety initiatives.208 FirstNet, authorized under the Middle Class Tax
201 ASS’N OF P UBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, supra note 172 (defining
interoperability to mean that “PSAPs can seamlessly (1) receive calls and related data from
origination networks, (2) share calls and related data among connecting ESInets, including
across state boundaries, and (3) hand off calls and related data with each other”).
202 Id.
203 Public Notice and Comments Sought Regarding Auction of Next-Generation
Wireless Services, 101 and 102, 83 Fed. Reg. 19660 (proposed May 4, 2018) (indicating
that although there has been no direct mention that funds may be available for the NG9-1-1
grant program, the FCC plans auctions in the 24 GHz and 28 GHz spectrum in the near
future, auctions 101 and 102, which would provide a full fix for the lack of funding
available for PSAPs).
204 Kirby, supra note 197; see also APCO International, Comment Letter on NTIA and
NHTSA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the 911 Grant Program, No. 170420407-740701 (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=NTIA-20170002-0010&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf.
205 Carter, supra note 37.
206 See e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 143.
207 NAT’L PUBLIC SAFETY TELECOMM . COUNCIL, FirstNet and NG9-1-1: High-Level
Overview of Systems and Functionality (Aug. 2015), http://www.npstc.org/download.jsp?
tableId=37&column=217&id=3466&file=How_NG911_Will_Work_with_FirstNet_FINAL
.pdf; Top Ten Frequently Asked Questions, FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/sites/default/
files/FirstNet_Partnership_FAQs__0.pdf (last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
208 Key Factors to Consider for the Governor to Opt-In or Opt-Out of the FirstNet Plan,
FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/sites/default/files/factors-governor-decision.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2018); Top Ten Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 207; Public Safety,
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Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, is not yet in operation but will be “a
wireless broadband network that will connect first responders.”209 FirstNet,
operating under the authority of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration of the Department of Commerce, is tasked with
working with states individually to aid in the deployment of the public safety
network and has the potential to serve as a model for increased cooperation
between private and public sector organizations.210 AT&T has been awarded a
25-year deal with FirstNet “to modernize and improve public safety
communications by leveraging private sector resources, infrastructure, and costsaving synergies to deploy and operate the Network.”211 FirstNet’s “opt-in/optout” approach is a system that can be revolutionary for the relationship between
the federal government, and its ability to work with states and local public safety
professionals.212
Under the FirstNet initiative, States have the option to opt-in and allow
FirstNet to deploy, operate, and maintain the state public safety Radio Access
Network (RAN) created by AT&T.213 If a State chooses to opt-out, the state
takes the responsibility to deploy, operate, and maintain the RAN.214 By
choosing to opt-in, a state’s RAN will effectively operate under FirstNet
authority, which in turn means funding for the network comes directly from
FirstNet.215 The alternative option, opting-out, can still result in funding through
National Telecommunications Industry Administration (NTIA) grant programs,
NAT’L TELECOMM & INFORMATION ADMIN., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/public-safety
(last visited Nov. 26, 2018).
209 NAT’L PUBLIC SAFETY TELECOMM . COUNCIL, supra note 207; Top Ten Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 207.
210 Top Ten Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 207 (discussing how “Public safety
organizations and associations advocated before Congress for a dedicated, reliable wireless
network for first responders”).
211 Id.
212 Key Factors to Consider for the Governor to Opt-In or Opt-Out of the FirstNet Plan,
supra note 208; see also Theo Douglas, All 50 States Have Joined FirstNet as Deadline
Closes, GOV’T TECH. (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/49-StatesHave-Joined-FirstNet-California-Remains-a-Mystery.html (stating that “all 50 states, along
with two territories and Washington, D.C.,” opted-in for FirstNet prior to the deadline);
Jackson, supra note 163 (discussing how FirstNet works with each state to make an
individualized plan).
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Consultation, FIRSTNET, https://www.firstnet.gov/consultation/funding (last visited
Nov. 26, 2018) (quoting “Members of the FirstNet outreach and design teams will work
closely with the designated single officer or governmental body to develop and deliver a
network deployment plan that meets their needs. FirstNet will then provide the Governor of
each State or territory with a notice of the completion of the request for proposal process;
the details of the proposed plan; and the funding level for the state or territory. Upon receipt
of the plan, a Governor will have 90 days to choose whether to participate in the plan
provided by FirstNet or conduct its own deployment of a radio access network”).
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although the option has been referred to as “more labor-intensive.”216
Ultimately, all “50 states, two territories, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa and the District of Columbia” chose to opt-in.217 The option of
having a federally implemented communications network for state and local
authorities has clearly gained significant traction in State and local governments,
and the FirstNet template can serve as the proper framework that Congress is
seeking for the NG9-1-1.218
The most transferable concept from FirstNet to NG9-1-1 is the opt-in and optout approach.219 APCO’s proposal to condition the grant of 9-1-1 funds to
PSAPs, which relies on the PSAPs acceptance and maintenance of certain
standards, is akin to an “opt-in” grant program.220 Similar to a State’s acceptance
of FirstNet’s implementation and operation of their public safety network, when
states opt-in, NTIA and NHSTA could grant NG9-1-1 funds on the condition
that States follow certain standards and maintain certain operational
capabilities.221 NTIA and NHSTA can serve as the monitoring agency; as with
FirstNet, where their duty is to ensure funds are directly utilized to further
federal standards set by the expert agencies.222 To encourage flexibility in the
implementation of NG9-1-1 and planning prospectively, states should be able to
either apply directly to NTIA and NHSTA, or have the option of submitting an
application that outlines and details original implementation plans that are
capable of meeting grant requirements, but may not necessarily be the provided
implementation procedure.223 This format does not overextend the federal
government, leaves states in control, and provides clear direction by offering
immediate incentives to further conditional federal procedures.
With the prospect of the NG9-1-1 grant program having increased
engagement and providing more direction and incentive for states to implement
next generation networks, an additional and pressing issue is ensuring the
216 Eyragon Eidam, 56 Jurisdictions Have Officially Opted in to FirstNet, GOV’T TECH.
(Oct. 2017), http://www.govtech.com/network/With-Jurisdictions-on-Board-FirstNetGathers-Forward-Momentum.html (stating that the alternative plan consists of various
deadlines an approval processes, at the end of which the State either has the opportunity to
purchase FirstNet service, or their plan is disapproved).
217 Id.
218 See id. (discussing how states have started opting-in to FirstNet as they realized the
benefits of the first “dedicated nationwide public safety communications network”).
219 See id. (explaining that states can opt-in to the network or opt-out and develop their
own system).
220 See Kirby, supra note 197 (explaining eligibility for funding, qualified applications
and the grant distribution process).
221 See Consultation, supra note 215 (outlining the specific requirements that states must
comply with in order to receive FirstNet funding).
222 See id.
223 APCO International, supra note 204.
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security following implementation.
B. Centralized Cybersecurity
In Chairman Tom Wheeler’s testimony before Congress, he proposed that
NG9-1-1 cybersecurity be incorporated into DHS’s “Einstein Program.”224 The
Einstein Program, managed by the National Cybersecurity Protection System
within DHS and originally proposed in 2003, was an initiative “to be the primary
cybersecurity system that would provide four major security capabilities to the
Federal Government, such as intrusion detection, intrusion prevention, data
analytics, and information sharing.”225 The program “was meant to be
disseminated and integrated across all 23 Federal agencies’ IT networking
systems to help safeguard any personally identifiable information (PII) and
avoid malicious web hacking attempts.”226 However, while the Einstein Program
was a promising idea, the actual implementation was insufficient.227 The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the Einstein Program
failed to meet the four objectives stated for itself, because twenty-three Federal
agencies were inconsistently adopting the program.228 While the Einstein
Program is currently not the all-encompassing and advanced cyber security
system it was created to be, a significant amount of financial resources have been
devoted to its improvement, with a forecasted total price tag of $5.7 billion.229
As of April 2018, DHS was seeking up to $644 million “for a mix of programs
to support federal agency cybersecurity, including the Continuous Diagnostics
and Mitigation program and the network shield system known as Einstein.”230 It
is clear that DHS is committed to not only improving the Einstein program, but
also providing general cyber security for all of the federal government.231
Hearings, supra note 9.
Joey Song, What is DHS EINSTEIN and Why Did It Fail?, BUS. 2 CMTY. (Feb. 23,
2016), https://www.business2community.com/cybersecurity/dhs-einstein-fail-01462281; see
also Aaron Boyd, GAO: $5.7B Einstein Cyber Program Isn’t Smart Enough Yet, FED. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.federaltimes.com/management/2016/01/29/gao-5-7b-einsteincyber-program-isnt-smart-enough-yet (referring to the cybersecurity tools used by the
Einstein Program).
226 Song, supra note 225.
227 See Boyd, supra note 225 (explaining how the technological capabilities of the
Einstein Program are limited).
228 DHS Needs to Enhance Capabilities, Improve Planning, and Support Greater
Adoption of Its National Cybersecurity Protection System, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
(Jan. 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674829.pdf; see also Boyd, supra note 225
(detailing how the Einstein Program is failing to accomplish all its objectives).
229 Boyd, supra note 225.
230 Mark Rockwell, DHS Seeks Growth in Cyber Budget, FWC (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/04/13/dhs-cyber-approps.aspx.
231 Id.
224
225
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However, DHS’s cyber efforts do not stop at the federal government.232
DHS has recently been engaged in providing aid to the Election Assistance
Commission in the management of a $380 million spending bill authorized “for
state and local governments to improve their election system cybersecurity.”233
Specifically, DHS has offered to provide “penetration testing, vulnerability
assessments, exercises, training as well as threat information bolstered by help
from the NSA and the intelligence community.”234 The significance of DHS
collaborating to provide security to a state function is evidence that DHS is not
only capable of providing cyber security to state authorities, but that this process
should be a standard DHS procedure. PSAP cybersecurity functions should not
only be supported by DHS, but are a natural extension of DHS cybersecurity.
Congress should either include PSAPs in the future of the Einstein program as
former Chairman Wheeler proposed or adopt a framework similar to Einstein
which has a single entity, such as DHS, providing cybersecurity implementation,
operation, and enhancement, to all PSAPs.
VI. CONCLUSION
PSAPs are, and should be, considered critical infrastructure, and NG9-1-1
will provide a much needed update to that infrastructure. They provide direction
and control to our emergency responders during times of emergency, and with
the updates of NG9-1-1, emergency responders and public safety officials will
have significantly more information, direction, and overall increased efficiency.
These improvements through IP-based networks, will save lives as well as
increase the current security of 9-1-1 systems. However, these vast
improvements and interconnectivity offer no solution to the security of
emergency communications networks. IP-based networks inherently lack proper
network security protocols. A long-term solution is vital to ensure continued
financial support to such critical infrastructure otherwise these technological
advancements will result in a fruitless endeavor. With the proper support for
PSAPs, the lifeblood of 9-1-1, cyber vulnerabilities may be significantly
mitigated. Given the current state of 9-1-1 and PSAPs being generally well
under-funded, the federal government is best positioned to provide support for a
nationwide transition to advance efforts. Because the nature of NG9-1-1 will
facilitate increased interconnectedness across regions, and eventually the nation,

Id.
Id.
234 Id.; see also Chloe Kim, Maryland Pounces on Federal Funding for Election
Cybersecurity, ST. SCOOP (Apr. 16, 2018), https://statescoop.com/maryland-pounces-onfederal-funding-for-election-cybersecurity.
232
233
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the federal government must treat future 9-1-1 networks as critical
infrastructure. If the 9-1-1 grant program provides the support it promises,
NG9-1-1 systems may be capable of hitting NENA’s target goal of having
nationwide NG9-1-1 by 2020.235 However, cybersecurity cannot be overlooked
and must take a central role of all future IP-based networks. While PSAP
cybersecurity concerns are being considered, evident by new legislation and
activity within administrative agencies, more must be done.236 By incorporating
PSAPs as critical infrastructure under the protection of DHS, a centralized
homeland-cybersecurity command can take a central role in mitigating risks and
providing undeviating support to a secure nationwide emergency call network.
What our country does now to support our 9-1-1 call centers may make the
difference between life and death in the emergencies of the future.

235 George Rice, Coalition Applauds NG911 Caucus Members in Requesting GAO
Review, 911.GOV (June 22, 2016), http://www.ng911now.org/blog/2016/6/22/coalitionapplauds-ng911-caucus-members-in-requesting-gao-review.
236 See Hearings, supra note 9; ASS’N OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMM. OFFICIALS-INT’L, supra
note 172.
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